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concern, I argue that reducing labour-market barriers should be one objective but not the exclusive focus of tax reform from a gender-equality perspective. Drawing on feminist scholarshipoutsidethetaxfield,Isuggestthatfiscalpolicyshouldalsobecraftedwithaviewto enhancingtheautonomyofthosewhoinvesttheirenergiesinprovidingunpaidcare.Designing rules about income splitting that encourage genuine redistribution of control over household resources would contribute modestly toward meeting this goal, at least for women with relatively affluent partners. However, I recommend that this be complemented by other tax andspendingreformsthatwouldoffsettheerosionofrevenuesresultingfromincomesplitting, providecaregiverswithaccesstoalternativesourcesofpublicsupportandfundchildcareand otherprogramsthatreducethecoststowomenofenteringthepaidworkforce.
I.THEDILEMMAOFINCOMESPLITTING:THECANADIANEXAMPLE
Thepolicychallengeofincomesplittingiscloselyrelatedtoacountry'schoiceoftaxunit.Since theadoptionofitsfirstfederalincometaxin1917,Canadahasalwaysdefinedthetaxpayeras the individual or corporate 'person' (Income Tax Act: s 2). The individual unit has been extensively eroded over time by family-related concessions and by the use of a joint unit for purposesoftax-deliveredbenefits(Lahey2005:74-76;LawCommissionofCanada2001:72-89). However, it has survived as a basic structural feature of Canadian income tax despite repeatedchallengesbysupportersofjointmaritalorfamilialtaxation(Lahey2000:40-44).In the1960s,boththeRoyalCommissiononTaxation(betterknownasthe'CarterCommission') and the Royal Commission on the Status of Women recommended a switch to family unit taxation (Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada 1970; Royal Commission on Taxation 1966). In the 1990s, social conservative advocacy groups and politicians lobbied for variousformsoftaxreliefforsingle-earnercoupleswithchildren,includingawholesaleshiftto jointfiling(Philipps2002:64-70).Amongthestatedreasonsthatpolicymakershavegivenfor rejecting such proposals and for maintaining the individual tax unit is the unfairness and negative labour-market incentives of joint taxation for women as secondary earners (Benson 1969; HouseofCommonsStandingCommitteeonFinance1999) . AcademicopinioninbothCanadaandtheUnitedStateshaslargelyvalidatedthisjudgement. Manyscholarshaveconcludedthatjointtaxationtendstodiscouragewomenfromenteringthe paidworkforceorfromspendingmoretimeonpaidlabourbecauseitraisesthemarginaltax rate on a couple's lower-earning partner, usually a woman whose employment is socially constructed as more discretionary than the man's (see, for example, Blumberg 1971; Brooks 1996; Lahey1995; McCaffery1992) .Inaddition,taxscholarshavecriticizedthepropensityof jointtaxationtorewardcoupleswithatraditionalgendereddivisionoflabourwitha'marriage bonus',whereastwo-earnercouplessuffera'marriagepenalty',especiallyifthespousesearn roughly the same amount (Brown 1997; Forman 1996) . Administratively, joint filing can also resultin'innocentspouses'beingstuckwithtaxliabilityforhouseholdincomeoverwhichthey havenolegalcontrol(Kahng2004).Inaddition,ajointunitprivilegescouplesoversinglesand privilegessomepersonalrelationshipsoverothersthatdonotenjoythesamedegreeoflegal recognitionbecause, forexample,theyarenotconjugalorarenotheterosexual(Brooks1996: 63; Infanti 2009 ). For all these reasons, tax policy analysts interested in questions of gender equalityhaveoverwhelminglyarguedagainstjointtaxation. Unfortunately,choosinganindividualunitdoesnotnecessarilyresolvetheconcernsraisedby joint taxation. All countries adopting individual taxation must contend with the incentives it creates for income splitting, which creates some of the very same problems more often associated with joint taxation. Canadian tax policy makers, for instance, have waged a long battletodesigneffectiveanti-avoidancerulestopreventincomesplitting (Donnelly,Mageeand Young2000) .Theprincipalstrategyhasbeentoignorecertainintra-familialpropertytransfers byattributingpassiveincomebacktothetransferorfortaxpurposes(IncomeTaxAct:ss74.1-74.5). These so-called attribution rules have never been more than partial, as they explicitly toleratesomeformsoftaxplanning.
1 Moreover,ithasnotbeeneasytoenforcethespiritofthe attribution rules through the courts in the face of tax-planning arrangements designed to circumventthem. PerhapsthewidestloopholewasopenedbytheSupremeCourtofCanadawhenitupheldasocalled dividend-sprinkling arrangement, whereby a spouse received special non-voting shares on incorporation of a family holding company (Duff 1999; Neuman v Minister of National Revenue1998) .Althoughthehusbandcontrolledthecorporationthroughhisownershipofthe voting shares and influenced the distribution of dividends, the Court refused to apply the attributionrulesonthebasisthatthecorporationwasaseparatepersonandthehusbandwas neverentitledtothedividendsthattheboardofdirectorshaddeclaredonhiswife'sshares.In responsetothisdecision,thegovernmentintroduceda'kiddietax',whichimposesthehighest marginal rate on private corporation dividends received by an individual who is under 18 throughout the taxation year (Income Tax Act: s 120.4). However, because it applied only to minors, this reform still permitted spousal dividend sprinkling, now a popular method of income splitting for those with significant income-generating assets and access to expert planningadvice.. The election in 2006 of a Conservative minority government has reignited the public debate overincomesplitting,asthereissignificantsupportforincomesplittingamongConservatives. Thissupportisreflectedintheparty'sofficialPolicyDeclaration,whichstates: Wesupporttheeliminationofalltaxdisadvantagesforfamiliesandthosewho care for children at home. It recognizes the economic value of stay at home parents,andsupportstheintroductionoftaxfairnessmeasuressuchasincome splittingforcoupleswithchildren.(ConservativePartyofCanada2008a:7) This resolution has not yet been adopted as government policy, perhaps because doing so would be costly. According to one estimate, the Canadian government would lose over $2 billionperyearifitextendedincomesplittingtoallcoupleswithchildren-andalmost$5billion ifitdidsoforallcouples(LibraryofParliament2007:5).However,the2006budgettookafirst steptowardpermittingmoreincomesplittingbyallowingtaxpayerstoreportuptoone-halfof theirprivatepensionincomeontheirspouse'sorcommon-lawpartner'staxreturn(IncomeTax Act:s60.03).Thisisunprecedented;Canadiantaxpayershaveneverbeforebeenpermittedto engageinthisformofincomesplitting,whichisonlynotional,becauseitispurelyafunctionof how tax returns are filled out. Previously, income splitting had always required a transfer or other restructuring of legal title to property or income. Pension income splitting can now be accomplishedwithoutanychangeoflegalcontrolovertheactualpensionincome,notevento theextentnecessarytocoverthespouse'sadditionaltaxliability(Woolley2007). The pension income splitting rules are as close to a joint return as has ever been possible in Canada.Anyemploymentorotherincomeearnedbythespousewillbestackedontopofthe pensionincomereportedonherreturn,creatingthesametypeofmarketbarrierasajointunit. The provisions also allow tax to be levied on 'innocent spouses' who have no access to the underlyingincome.Althoughthemeasurecurrentlyappliestoonlyonesourceofincome(and onlytotaxpayersover55),itestablishedaprecedent.Indeed,theConservativeshavealready promisedtoextendthismodelofincomesplittingtoallsourcesofincomeforfamiliesinwhich one spouse works less than full-time in order to care for a child or an adult with a disability (ConservativePartyofCanada2008b:8).
2 Followingtheirre-electionwithanotherminority,theConservativegovernmentcreatedanew Tax Free Savings Account (TFSA), which also has an income-splitting component (Income Tax Act:s146.2) .Taxpayersmaymakenon-deductiblecontributionsofupto$5,000perannumto a TFSA, with no limit on total contributions. Investment income and capital gains earned on contributions are tax exempt, as are all withdrawals from the account. Most importantly for present purposes, gifts to a spouse or common-law partner that are used to fund a TFSA are exempt from the attribution rules (Income Tax Act: s 74.5(12)(c)). This concession effectively providesone-earnercoupleswithaccesstotwoTFSAs,providedtheyhavethemeanstosave morethan$5,000eachyear. Reactiontothesedevelopmentsbyfeministscholarsandgender-equalityadvocateshasbeen stronglynegative(seeHouseofCommonsStandingCommitteeontheStatusofWomen2008). For example, a coalition of activists and academics (including the author) working with the CanadianFeministAllianceforInternationalAction(FAFIA)calledfortherepealofthepension incomesplittingrulesandopposedtheirextensiontomorecouplesforthefollowingreasons:
• Thetaxsavingswillbereceivedmainlybyhigher-incomemen.
• Income splitting discourages women's paid workforce participation by increasingthetaxrateonanyincomeearnedinthemarket.
• Income splitting biases the tax code in favour of couples with very unequalincomesandagainstotherfamilyforms,includingsingleparents, unattachedindividualsandcoupleswithmoreequalincomes.
• Dependentspouses/common-lawpartnersreceivenodirectbenefit,and infactwillsufferadditionalburdens,becausetheyareliableforthetax buthavenolegalentitlementtotheunderlyingincome.
• Thegradualextensionofincomesplittingtocoverallcoupleswouldbeso costly as to preclude more effective and equitable programs to support familiesandcaregivers(CanadianFeminist Alliance for International Action undated: 11; see also Weir 2007; Woolley2007). Notably, these points overlap substantially with the criticisms usually levelled against joint filing. Canadian economist Jonathan Kesselman has made similar arguments regarding why either joint taxation or full splitting of employment income would be unfair to two-earner couples and would reduce women's labour supply in ways harmful to their full equality (Kesselman 2008: 25-34) . Similarly, in the United States, Lawrence Zelenak has argued in favourofanindividualunitbuthasopposedtheideaofrecognizinginter-spousalassignments of earned income under such a system because it would recreate the labour-market disincentiveofjointtaxationsince,ashepointsout,'thewife'sincomewillstillbestackedon topofthehusband's,andshewillbediscouragedfromworking '(Zelenak1994:380) .Iarguein the balance of this chapter that concerns about discouraging women's paid work through incomesplittingarevalidbutshouldbetemperedbyequallyvalidconcernsabouttheneedto encourage intra-household redistribution and to give unpaid caregivers greater control over householdeconomicresources. ThestrongfeministoppositiontorecenttaxreformsinCanadashouldbeunderstoodincontext as a reaction to the specific forms of income splitting being promoted by the Conservative government, which is perceived generally as hostile to equality norms. This image was reinforced by several high-profile spending cuts and other policy moves targeting gender equalityprograms,asreviewedbyKathleenLaheyinchapter1ofthisvolume(seealsoBrodie andBakker2008).Inothercontexts,taxscholarshavesometimesarguedthatincomesplitting maybequiteconsistentwithgender-equalitygoals.Thisperspectiveiselaboratedbelow,with aviewtodevelopingafeministapproachthatdistinguishesthemostharmfulformsofincome splittingfromthosewhichcouldbedesirableifcombinedwithothertaxandspendingreforms thatenhancewomen'seconomicautonomy.
II.WHATINCOMESPLITTINGRULESWOULDBESTPROMOTEGENDEREQUALITY?
A gender equality case can be made for allowing some types of income splitting between conjugal partners, specifically where there is an actual transfer of legal and beneficial title to propertyorincome.However,severalconcernsandcaveatsattendeventhispreferredformof incomesplitting.Whilethebasicanalysispresentedherecouldapplytoanycountrythattaxes conjugal partners as individuals, I concretize the arguments by describing specific reform proposals for Canada. The discussion will be organized around three claims that are typically madetosupporttheargumentforallowingmoreincomesplittingongenderequalitygrounds:
(1) that such a system would encourage more equal sharing of economic resources between menandwomen,(2)thatitwouldrespectwomen'sagencyaspropertyownersand(3)thatit would recognize women's unpaid contributions to household welfare. The analysis is predicatedontheassertionthatgenderequalityisnolesslegitimateameasureforevaluating taxpolicythanarethemorefamiliarcriteriaofverticalandhorizontalequityamongdifferent groups defined by income level, non-discretionary needs or choice of economic activity (cf Zelenak1994:380,385).However,taxpolicycanaddressitselftogenderequalityonlyifrules are designed with an awareness of intra-household impacts and of the relative treatment of paid and unpaid economic activities undertaken by partners in a marriage or common-law relationship (both of which are recognized in Canadian tax law as discussed in chapter 11 by WarmanandWoolley).
A.INCENTIVIZINGINTRA-HOUSEHOLDREDISTRIBUTION
Commentators have asserted that the Canadian attribution rules, which ignore inter-spousal gifts and even some fair market value sales for income tax purposes, have 'the effect of discouraging husbands from transferring family property to their wives during marriage and thus achieving a more equitable distribution of wealth' (Brooks 1996: 74; see also Kesselman 2008:24) .Conversely,ithasbeensuggestedthat'whentaxliabilityfollowslegalownershipof incomes and property, individual taxation of people in relationships promotes economic sharing' (Lahey 2005: 26 ; see also Gann 1980: 50-51; Zelenak 1994: 384-87) . Claire Young recommended that empirical research be undertaken in Canada to assess whether repealing theattributionruleswouldactuallyresultinmoreassettransfersfrommentowomen (2000: 45, 48-49) . Since then, a U.K. study has found evidence of just such an effect (Stephens and Ward-Batts2004).TheU.K.switchedfromjointtoindividualtaxationin1990andallowedinter-spousal transfers without any attribution of income from the transferred property. Stephens and Ward-Batts examined the relative shares of investment income reported by higher-and lower-incomespousesbeforeandafterthereformandfound'strongevidencethathouseholds did indeed take advantage of this opportunity for tax avoidance through income shifting', though most households did not exploit its full potential (2004: 2005-2006 ' (2007: 613) . These comments highlight the crucial distinction betweenincomesplittingthatisbasedonactualsharingofcontroloverresources,versusthat whichisbasedonareallocationofincomefortaxpurposesonly.Whilethefirstispotentially gender equalizing, the second merely ratifies existing distributions of economic power within households.Kesselmanhasarguedthatthenotionalpensionincomesplittingrulesmayinfact resultinamoreequitablegenderdistributionofresourcesbecausethepartnerwiththelower taxratemustgiveconsentbeforepensionincomecanbeshiftedtoherreturn,andthisshould increase her power to bargain for a share of the income (2008: 22) . However with this approach the onus rests entirely on the financially dependent spouse to wrest control over household resources through a process of private bargaining in which power differentials of manykindscanstillbeexpectedtoshapetheoutcome.Atbest,onecouldimagineasavvyand relativelyempoweredspouseinsistingonenoughincometocovertheadditionaltaxliabilityas well as a portion of the higher after-tax income obtained through income splitting. By comparison, making income splitting conditional on a transfer of underlying assets would create a much stronger incentive for richer spouses to transfer title to income-producing propertywhichwouldincreasethetransferee'seconomicpowerandsecurityoverthelonger term. If Canadian tax policy makers sought to incentivize intra-household transfers, they would therefore have to repeal both the notional pension income splitting rules and the attribution rules that ignore real transactions between spouses. One caveat is that in order to avoid attributionoffutureincome,thepropertytransferitselfshouldbetaxedonacurrentbasisso thatanyaccruedgainisrealizedinthehandsofthetransferorspouse.Thiswouldnotonlylimit therevenuelossfromallowingmoreincomesplitting;itwouldalsoreinforcetheincentivefor sharing ownership within marriage by encouraging property-owning spouses to transfer appreciatingassetsearly,beforesignificantgainshadaccrued.
B.RESPECTINGWOMEN'SAGENCY
A second argument in favour of recognizing genuine inter-spousal transfers is the need to respectwomen'sagencyaslegalrightsholders.Ignoringthesetransactionsseemsinconsistent with the basic principle of individual taxation-that people should be taxed on income which theylegallycontrol,andit'failstorecognizetheautonomyofthespousereceivingtheproperty (usuallythewife) '(Brooks1996:74; seealsoDuff1999:379) . Similarly,Laheycommentsthat womenaretoooftentreatedasmerepuppetsintaxplanningtransactions(2000:119) . A common objection to this view is that inter-spousal transfers may be purely formalistic, reflectingnochangeindefactodecision-makingpower.Thisconcernmustalsounderpinthe argumentthatincomesplittingreducestheprogressivityofthetaxsystem,asthisassumesthe incomereallybelongstothetransferorinsomeeconomicsensedespitelegaltitlebeingheldby the transferee. One way to address the issue of informal control would be to enact administrative and anti-avoidance rules that established criteria for ascertaining whether the transfereewasthetrueownerofthetransferredproperty(Lahey2000:119;Philipps2002).It would be important to require spouses to submit some form of written evidence of their contractualarrangementswiththeirtaxreturns(Gann1980:63).Inaddition,therearemany precedentswithintaxsystemsworldwideofrulesthatlookbeyondtheformofatransactionto assess its economic substance. In Canada, for example, control of a corporation for some purposes is defined not only by the traditional de jure test of majority ownership of voting sharesbutalsobyadefactotestthatconsiderswhetherapersonexercisescontrol'directlyor indirectlyinanymannerwhatever'overthecorporation(IncomeTaxAct:s256(5.1)).Defacto control can include a situation where a single creditor is allowed to withdraw all of the corporation's financing by demanding repayment of a loan on short notice (Canada Revenue Agency 2001: paras 19-23). Another rule that could be adapted to apply to inter-spousal transfers is the provision that denies the charitable donation credit for so-called 'loanback' arrangements, where a donor uses any property of a charitable entity within five years after making a donation to that charity (Income Tax Act: s.118.1(16)). This provision applies, for instance,ifaprivatefoundationlendsmoneybacktoadonor,eveniftheloanisatamarket rateofinterest.Inaddition,Canadaalreadyhasarulethatpreventsincomesplittingthrough revocabletrusts,whicharedefinedverybroadly(IncomeTaxAct:s75(2)).Ifthetrustproperty mayreverttothesettloratanyfuturetime,orifthesettlorhasanyrighttodetermineoreven consent to distributions of trust property to others, then all the income and capital gains realized by the trust are attributed back to the settlor. 3 These examples show that for many purposes,Canadiantaxpolicymakershavebeenpreparedtodistinguishsubstantivechangesof ownershipfromthosethataremerelysuperficialtaxavoidancedevices. Kesselmanobjectsthatsuchanti-avoidanceruleswouldbecostlyandintrusivetoapplyinthe caseofinter-spousaltransfers(2008:24)However,thiscriticismcouldbedirectedtowardany anti-avoidance rule that employed broad standards such as 'reasonableness' which require interpretation, rather than bright line tests. Such standards constitute an essential tool for reducing avoidance precisely because they inject some flexibility to deal with new and unforeseentransactions,andcreatesomeuncertaintyastohowfartherulesmaybestretched bytaxplanners(Edgar2008:874;RoyalCommisiononTaxation1966:552-567).Anti-avoidance rules thus serve as deterrents to aggressive tax planning, even in cases where they are not directlyappliedorenforcedbyrevenueauthorities. Absentsomeformofblatantretentionofdefactocontrolovertheuseofassets,transfersof legal and beneficial title should be treated as tax effective on the basis that transferees are rationalagentswiththecapacitytoexercisetheirlegalrightsdirectlyorthroughtheprocessof bargaining with a spouse over consumption decisions. Empirical evidence supports the view thatwomentendtoenjoygreaterpoweroverhouseholdfinancialdecisionsandfeellessguilt about spending money when they have a stream of income that is legally their own (Burton, Phipps and Woolley 2007; Kornhauser 1993: 80-91) . The studies emphasize that couples are extremelydiverseintermsoftheextenttowhichtheysharedecision-makingpowerabouthow income will be spent, managerial responsibility for banking, and the actual consumption of income.HoweverKornhauserconcludedafterreviewingherownandotherempiricalstudies onintra-householdfinancialmanagementthat" [d]espitethepresenceofjointaccountsanda beliefinresourcesharing,controlofthemoneygenerallystillresideswiththeearner"(1993: 90) .Iftheincomeisderivedfrompropertythetitle-holdingspousecanexertcontroloverboth the income stream and the underlying asset, further increasing her chances of financial autonomy. As Zelenak argues, 'owners of wealth can always determine how to employ that wealth. Even if . . . owners cede some control over the consumption of their income by marrying,theystillhavecontroloverthesourceoftheincome(aswellascontroloverwhether tostaymarried) '(1994:357) . Even in cases where a transfer of title does not alter substantive power relations within a relationship, legal ownership may become more important on relationship breakdown. Canadianfamilylawprovidesforpropertyequalizationupondivorcebutformalrightsareoften difficultfor anon-titledspouse to enforce in practice fora hostofreasons-includinglackof accesstocostlylegaladviceortocourtsinordertoestablishorenforceaclaim;thedifficultyof tracing assets that may be owned outside the country; pressures to trade child custody for a lesser share of property; the exclusion of some intangibles like professional degrees and licences from what is considered divisible property; and the legal uncertainty surrounding otherssuchasunvestedpensionplanrights(Bala1989;Grassby2004;Langer1994;Poirierand Boudreau 1992; Law Commission of Ontario 2008). Moreover statutory property equalization regimes do not apply to common-law partners in most provinces, making title even more important in determining the post-relationship distribution of assets for these couples (Law CommissionofOntario2008:39;Mossman2008).Thus,encouragingintra-householdtransfers promotesthelong-termfinancialsecurityofalesser-earningspouseorpartner,evenwherethe transferor continues to exercise a degree of informal influence over the use of property or incomewhiletherelationshipsubsists.
C.VALUINGWOMEN'SUNPAIDLABOUR
An argument frequently advanced to justify income splitting is that it recognizes the value of women's unpaid contributions. In considering this claim, it is worth distinguishing between unpaidcaregivingforchildrenorotherdependentsontheonehandand,ontheotherhand, unpaidworkthatisdoneinformallywithinfamilybusinessesortoassistemployees.Elsewhere I have described this latter form of activity as 'unpaid market labour' because it contributes directlytothegenerationofmarketincome (Philipps2008a,2008b .Iarguebelowthatwhile Canadian tax rules should make it easier to deduct amounts paid to compensate a family member for informal assistance in a business or job, using income splitting as a means of compensatingunpaidcaregiversismoreproblematicfromagender-equalityperspective. With respect to unpaid market labour, many sociological studies have documented the roles that family members play in the operation of small businesses and professional firms and in directly assisting with employment duties of their spouses or other relatives (reviewed in Philipps 2008a: 92-98). Spouses may perform tasks that are easily recognizable as a contributiontobusinessoperationsormanagementortothefulfillmentoftheotherspouse's employment obligations. A spouse may also serve in a capacity such as social host or communityambassadorforanorganizationthatisownedbyoremploystheotherspouse.One scholar has used the term 'two-person career' to describe middle-class jobs in which spousal participation is expected or desired in order to generate goodwill, develop commercial relationships or simply provide backup for the paid worker (Papanek 1973) . Recent studies suggest that the flexibilization of labour markets and working practices and the rise of selfemployment and micro-businesses have ensured ongoing and perhaps rising demand for this unpaid market labour within many families (see eg. Baines et al 2002; Baines and Wheelock 1998; Danes and Olsen 2003; Eardley and Cordon 1996: 111; Rowe and Hong 2000) . While more empirical research is required to determine the full extent of unpaid market labour contributedtodifferenteconomies,Ihavearguedthatexistingevidenceissufficienttojustify theassumptionthatmostpaidworkersrelytosomedegreeonthisformofdirectsupportfor theirmarketactivities(Philipps2008a:101). Anti-avoidancerulesdesignedtopreventincomesplittingmayactuallydiscouragepaymentof aninformalfamilyassistantforherorhisservices.Forexample,historically,Canadianincome taxlegislationimposedapresumptionthatspouseswerenotbusinesspartnersfortaxpurposes (Income Tax Act: s 74(5) ; Philipps 2008a: 77) . While this rule was repealed in the late 1970s, revenue administrators and courts remained sceptical in some cases toward claims that spouses had a commercial partnership, even in the face of evidence of a wife's extensive 12CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL.06NO.01 involvement in a business (see, for example, Cullen v. Canda 1985; Kuchirka (M.) v. Canada 1991; Sedelnick Estate v. Minister of National Revenue 1986) . It is particularly difficult under Canadian law for an employee to deduct wages or fees paid to a spouse who assists in their work. Such costs may be deducted only by an employee who is 'required by the contract of employment'tohireandpayanassistant(IncomeTaxActs8 (1)(i)(iii) ).Thus,evenwherethere is clear factual evidence that a spouse has rendered valuable services to assist his or her employee-spouseinperformingjobdutiesandevenwhentheemployerknewofandpermitted thisarrangement,anycompensationpaidtothespouseisnon-deductibleunlessmandatedby theemployee'scontract.Revenueauthoritieshavestatedasamatterofadministrativepolicy that this condition will 'ordinarily' require an express term in a written employment contract butthatitmayalsobesatisfied'wherethetaxpayercanestablishthatitwastacitlyunderstood by both parties (the taxpayer and the employer) that such payment was to be made by the taxpayer and was, in fact, necessary under the circumstances to fulfill the duties of the employment'(CanadaRevenueAgency1994:para1).However,itisnotclearwhatwillsuffice asevidenceofsuchatacitunderstanding. The courts have taken different views of this question. In one recent case, the Tax Court of Canada held that a branch manager for investment advisor Merrill Lynch could not deduct a salary paid to his wife, as his written contract of employment was silent on the need for an assistant, though the employer had signed a separate form confirming that an assistant was required ( Theunfairnessofthisregimeishighlightedbythefactthatbusinessproprietorshaveamuch broader scope for deducting wages or fees paid to family members. These expenses may be deducted just like any others that are incurred 'for the purpose of earning income' from the business, subject to a reasonableness test (Income Tax Act: ss 9(1), 18(1)(a), 67). The courts have also conferred significant discretion on business owners in setting the amount of family salaries,whichneednotbelimitedtothemarketrateforanequivalentnon-familyemployee (CieIdéalBodyv.R.1989; MadukeFoodsLtd.vR.1989) .Whilethecurrentrulesforbusiness owners may be too generous, they do encourage the redistribution of profits to spouses and otherrelativesinvolvedwiththebusiness,especiallybymalebusinessowners(Schuetze2006). A similar regime should be adopted for employees whose spouses help them carry out job duties(cf.Kesselman2008:28).Isuggestitisnotevenappropriatetodescribecommercially reasonablecompensationofafamilyassistantas'incomesplitting',asthissuggestsagratuitous payment purely driven by tax-avoidance motives. While there may be a tax incentive for an individual to employ their spouse, this alone does not negate the income-earning purpose of thearrangementorthevalueoftheservicesprovided. A possible criticism of my proposal is that it would encourage women to work for their husbandsinsteadofseekingindependentemployment.However,aspouse'sinvolvementinthe work of a primary breadwinner should not be regarded stereotypically as merely a form of subjugation or gender oppression. For some women at some times, collaboration in a family enterprisemayprovidebetteropportunitiesandwork-lifebalance,andindeedmoreeconomic power, than the regular labour market (Philipps 2008a) . Neither, however, should such arrangementsberomanticizedassomehowfreeoftheconflictinginterestsandhierarchiesof family life. Household inequalities are reinforced by a tax regime that discourages fair compensation of spouses for their informal market work by denying deductibility for tax purposes.Liberalizingtheruleswouldnotonlyencourageredistributionofcontrolovermarket income within households but would also help to degender market work symbolically by acknowledgingthatitisfrequentlyproducedthroughthejointlabourofspouses. Using income splitting as a mechanism to recognize the value of unpaid caregiving is more problematic. For instance, some commentators have suggested allowing taxpayers to deduct actualpaymentstoaspousewhoisprovidingunpaidcaretodependents(Duff2000:73-74)or simply extending the notional pension income splitting rules to all couples (Mintz 2008: 17) . Whilesomesuchproposalsopenlypromoteapatriarchalmodelofthefamilywithmoresharply defined gender roles (eg, Szabo 1997), others present it as a route to greater equality within relationships. Undoubtedly, the failure of public policy to value the work of caregivers is significantlylinkedtowomen'songoingeconomicinequality.YetIwouldarguethatpromoting more income splitting of any kind is a problematic strategy for addressing this issue. When a spouse directly assists an employee or entrepreneur to produce income, these are marketoriented services that primarily benefit the individual income earner. By contrast, unpaid caregivingprovidesmoresignificantbenefitstosocietyatlarge.Inter-spousaltransferscannot be the main way of recognizing these contributions because that would leave primary caregivers dependent on the goodwill of individual breadwinners. Rather, a system of refundabletaxcreditsorotherstatetransfersisneededtoincreasetheautonomyofprimary caregivers by providing an alternate source of economic security. In Canada, such a system could be financed by repealing the spousal credit and other dependency credits delivered to primary earners and discussed by Casey Warman and Frances Woolley in chapter x and replacingthemwitharefundablecreditpaiddirectlytocaregivers (LawCommissionofCanada 2001: 73) . This approach would have the advantage of reaching single caregivers and those living in lower-income households, who receive little or no benefit from income splitting, or indeedthosewhoseaffluentspousesarenotinterestedinintra-householdredistribution. Somefeministtaxscholarshaveobjectedtocaregiversubsidies,evenifdelivereddirectlytothe intended beneficiaries, because they strengthen the already significant incentives for many womentoengageinunpaidratherthanpaidwork(see,forexample,Lahey2005:41-42).This viewisconsistentwiththeliteraturereviewedearlierinthischapteronthechoiceoftaxunit, inwhichtheoverridingconcernhasbeentoreducebarrierstowomen'spaidlabour. Strategies to demarginalize caregiving work have received far less attention within tax scholarship. While improving women's labour-market opportunities is obviously a crucial dimension of gender-equality struggles, feminist scholars working outside the tax field have increasinglyarguedthatthisneedstobetemperedwitheffortstovaluecaregiverworkandto assignitmoreequallytomenandwomen.JoanWilliams,forexample,hasdiscussedthefailure of a 'full commodification' strategy, focused singlemindedly on equalizing employment opportunities,toachievegender-equalitygoals(Williams2000:40-48).Amongotherproblems, she points out that this strategy glosses over the discrimination and poor working conditions that many women face in the labour market and the relative satisfaction and solidarity they may derive from their family work, a perspective that has been voiced especially by many womenofcolourandworking-classwomen.Similarly,NancyFraserhasarguedthata'universal breadwinner'modelofgenderequalitythatvalueslabourmarketaccessaboveallelsefailsto address the problem that women continue to do the bulk of unpaid household work, even whentheyareemployedfulltime(Fraser1997:41-68).Iffeministtaxscholarsdonotdirectly address the need to value unpaid caregiving, they risk ceding this ground to a social conservative movement that has a clearly defined politics of promoting one-earner families(LuxtonandVosko1998:52). Biases in taxation and other biases against women's paid labour do need to be addressed. However,thesebarriersshouldbetackledmoredirectlythroughtaxreformsaimedatlowering thecostofenteringpaidworkandreducingthefiscalburdenonsecondaryearners.Providing better access to substitute care services is obviously a central requirement, whether through tax deductions or direct programming. Lahey has outlined a comprehensive set of recommendationsforreducingthehighmarginaltaxratesexperiencedbysecondaryearnersin Canada,includingapossibleearnedincometaxcreditor,alternatively,fulldeductibilityforthe costsofearningemploymentorbusinessincome(2005;seealsoKesselman2008).Thesecould beimplementedalongsiderefundablecaregivercreditstoneutralizeanytaxbiasinfavourof householdproduction.
III.REALINCOMESPLITTING
Thischapterhasofferedafeministinterventioninthedebateoverincomesplittingbycouples, a topic that is perennially troublesome for countries that treat individuals as separate taxpayers.Ithashighlightedtheconfusionthatariseswhentheterm'incomesplitting'isused to describe both real and notional transactions between conjugal partners. I argue that differentiating these phenomena is the key to articulating a tax policy solution that coheres with gender-equality goals. That solution, I propose, is to recognize real income-splitting transactionsmorereadilyfortaxpurposeswhileeliminatingnotionalincomesplittingrulesin tax legislation. The practical implication of these principles will vary from country to country, dependingonthedetailsoftheirexistingtaxregimes. Asdemonstratedinthischapter,nosingletaxreformcanachievesignificantprogresstoward genderequalityinisolation,becausewomencompriseahighlydiversegroupandbecausetaxes interactwithtransfersandotherpolicies,andwithinformalnormsthatinfluencebehaviourin markets and families. In the Canadian context, however, I suggest the following set of complementary reforms: (1) repealing the pension income splitting rules; (2) repealing the attributionrules,subjecttoanti-avoidanceprovisionsdesignedtocatchtransfersthathaveno economic substance and subject to the transferor realizing any accrued gains at the time of transfer;(3)replacingspousaldependencycreditswithanewrefundablecreditortransferfor caregivers who individually have low incomes; and (4) creating new tax or direct-spending measurestoreducethefiscalandothercostbarriersthatdiscouragesecondaryearnersfrom undertakingpaidlabour.
